Ghana to Cut Small-Scale Gold Purchase Price by 3% in 2027 to Slash Reserve-Building Costs

Ghana plans to introduce a 3% discount on small-scale gold purchases in 2027, a move aimed at reducing the cost of building foreign exchange reserves after the financial burden of the gold-buying programme shifted from the central bank to the Ministry of Finance.

The measure, outlined in the 2027 Budget presented to Parliament on Thursday, November 12, 2026, comes as the cost of generating foreign exchange through the Ghana Accelerated National Reserve Accumulation Policy (GANRAP) fell from 16% in 2025 to 5% in 2026. The government now intends to push that cost down to 2% .

“To reduce this cost further to 2 per cent, Government will, in consultation with industry stakeholders, introduce a 3 per cent discount on small-scale gold purchases in 2027,” the budget states .

The Roots of the Losses

The proposal directly addresses a problem that has weighed heavily on the Bank of Ghana’s balance sheet. Under the previous arrangement, GoldBod facilitated gold purchases on behalf of the central bank, buying from small-scale miners at spot prices—and in some cases at a premium. GoldBod earned service fees, while the Bank of Ghana financed the purchases and absorbed the losses .

The Bank of Ghana’s 2025 financial statements reported losses of approximately GH¢22 billion from the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme . The International Monetary Fund estimated those losses at over US$1.7 billion, equivalent to 1.5% of GDP, driven largely by service and assay fees paid to GoldBod, discounts on gold sold to off-takers, and—most significantly—exchange rate losses from the spread between the forex bureau rate paid to purchase gold and the cedi reference rate used for central bank accounting .

Some losses reflected valuation effects rather than direct economic costs, but they nevertheless weakened the central bank’s balance sheet and exposed it to quasi-fiscal risks.

A New Architecture

Responsibility for the programme has since changed. GoldBod began conducting doré gold purchases on April 1, 2026, and a memorandum signed in July formalised the transfer of the programme from the Bank of Ghana . Under the new model, GoldBod mobilises financing directly from commercial banks and offtakers, ending its role as a buying agent for the central bank .

The IMF has described the reform as eliminating the Bank of Ghana’s exposure to incremental quasi-fiscal risks, with all costs of the programme now transparently assumed by the government .

But transferring the financial burden did not automatically make the underlying transactions cheaper. The proposed 3% discount now targets the purchase price itself—the one variable the government can adjust directly.

The Miner’s Dilemma

The discount carries a risk: if official buying prices fall too low, small-scale miners may divert their gold to informal channels or sell across borders where terms are more attractive. GoldBod itself warned in January 2026 that discounted purchases could encourage smuggling, arguing that competitive pricing was necessary to keep gold flowing through formal channels .

The Ghana National Association of Small-Scale Miners had earlier proposed a 2% discount for licensed buyers as part of recommendations submitted to GoldBod after nationwide consultations . The government’s 3% proposal goes further.

The budget says the measure will be developed in consultation with industry stakeholders, specifically calling on the National Association of Small-Scale Miners and the Licensed Gold Buyers Associations to support the reforms .

The Stakes

The programme’s importance to Ghana’s external position is difficult to overstate. The Finance Minister told Parliament that GoldBod exported 88 tonnes of small-scale gold valued at US$12 billion since January 2026—more than the 80.64 tonnes valued at US$10.23 billion exported by the large-scale mining sector over the same period .

Those earnings have been supporting foreign-exchange supply, reserve accumulation, and the cedi’s stability.

The government’s own target suggests the discount will reduce the programme’s cost rather than eliminate it. Even after the proposed adjustment, the budget envisages a remaining cost of 2%. The question for Parliament and industry stakeholders alike is whether that remaining margin leaves enough room to cover refining, transport, and financing costs—without driving miners away from the formal system the programme depends on.

As the budget moves into deliberations, the 3% discount stands as a concrete response to an acquisition-cost problem that has drained billions from the central bank. Whether it narrows the gap without shrinking the gold supply will determine whether Ghana’s gold-to-foreign-exchange model can sustain itself at a lower cost.